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DIVORCE BARGAINING: THE
LIMITS ON PRIVATE ORDERINGt
Robert H. Mnookin*
In an article published in the Yale Law Journal, I suggested
an alternative perspective for family law scholars concerned with
divorce. 1 It emphasized negotiation, not adjudication; private ordering, not regulation. This change in emphasis seemed timely,
if not overdue. Available evidence has long shown that the overwhelming majority of divorcing couples resolve the distributional questions concerning marital property, alimony, child support, and custody without bringing any contested issue to court
for adjudication. Therefore, the primary impact of the legal system falls not on the small number of contested cases, but instead on the far greater number of divorcing couples outside the
courtroom who bargain in the shadow of the law. Thus, my emphasis is on negotiation not adjudication.
Other evidence supported an emphasis on private ordering,
not regulation. Since 1966, the American legal system has undergone a radical transformation that still continues. Before the nofault revolution, divorce law attempted to restrict private ordering severely. The state asserted broad authority to define when
divorce was appropriate, to structure the economic relationship
of the spouses, and to regulate their relationship to their children. The pretense of regulation has largely disappeared. American law now recognizes explicitly that a primary function of law
at the time of divorce is to provide a framework within which
divorcing couples may exercise great freedom to determine
themselves their postdissolution rights and responsibilities. Divorce no longer requires a judicial determination of a "marital
offense." With respect to spousal support and marital property,
most states permit a .couple to make binding and final agreet This Article is based on a paper originally presented at the Fourth Annual
Conference of the International Society of Family Law, held at Harvard University in
June 1982 which was published in THE RESOLUTION OF FAMILY CONFLICT: COMPARATIVE
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 364-383 (J. Eekelaar and S. Katz eds. 1984). Reprinted by
permission of Butterworth & Co. (Canada) Ltd ..
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. A.B., 1964, LL.B., 1968, Harvard University.
1. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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ments-i.e., not subject to later modification by a court. For
those decisions that directly affect children-child support, custody, and visitation-parents lack the formal power to make
their own law. American courts typically are required to "review" the parental arrangement, which later can be modified in
light of substantial changes in circumstances. But absent a dispute, divorcing parents actually have the power to make their
own deals. Typically, courts rubber-stamp separation agreements, even in cases involving children. Moreover, legislative
changes approving joint custody and assorted appellate rulings
increasingly acknowledge that the parties to a divorce should
have a very broad latitude to decide for themselves by agreement the distributional questions posed by divorce. Indeed, the
current interest in divorce mediation underlines the increasing
emphasis on private ordering, for a mediator helps the parties
reach a negotiated agreement but does not impose an outcome.
But is private ordering a good thing? This paper defends the
proposition that it is, and that the primary goal of the state at
the time of a divorce is to facilitate the process by which the
parties themselves decide the consequences of the divorce. I
should make clear from the outset that I am unwilling to defend
the absurd proposition that the state should simply withdraw all
resources from the dispute settlement process, and leave it to
the divorcing spouses to work things out on their own, unassisted by any professional help or legal protection. To the contrary, my use of the term "private ordering" was never meant to
imply either (1) that law and the legal system are unimportant;
or (2) that no important social interests exist in how the process
works or in the fairness of its outcomes. Consequently, an adequate defense of private ordering requires two prongs: first, a
justification of why generally the legal system should permit
(and indeed encourage) divorcing couples to work out their own
arrangements; and second, a justification for imposing some limits on private ordering. When I began thinking about this article,
I was confident that I could provide the first part-the general
defense. But I was less confident that I could give reasons for
limiting private ordering that would not in the process sabotage
this defense.
Defining the limits of private ordering is obviously relevant
both to policy makers and those involved professionally in divorce bargaining on a day-to-day basis. The issue arises in many
different ways. Should mediators, for example, consider only
whether a deal is made? To what extent should lawyers representing individual clients be prepared to "sign off'' with respect
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to an agreement that substantially differs from what a court
would most likely impose? Should courts review divorce settlements, and if so, what principles should inform that review?
Should the state permit divorcing couples to agree to an outcome that a court would not order? Under what circumstances
should a party be able to object to the enforcement of an earlier
agreement? When should persons not parties to the bargain
(e.g., grandparents, children, the welfare department) be able to
set aside an agreement, even if the parties to the bargain do not
object?
My purpose here is neither to address these specific policy
questions nor to specify the precise procedural and substantive
rules that should constrain private ordering. Instead this article
addresses what I see as the underlying question: should limits
exist to private ordering at the time of divorce, and if so, why? I
hope to answer this question in a way that provides a framework
helpful to those concerned with policy.
The Article proceeds as follows. I first briefly present a general
justification for private ordering. I then explore the reasons that
limits are necessary. I argue that three justifications exist (or
limiting private ordering, each of which may warrant procedural
or substantive safeguards. The first concerns the issue of capacity. Are divorcing spouses able to make deliberate and informed
judgments necessary to decide whether a particular agreement is
in their interests? The second concerns relative bargaining
power. I will show how, even against a backdrop of just substantive entitlements and fair procedures, "one-sided" settlements
can nevertheless result. The third concerns externalities, which
arise because divorce bargains can often have important consequences for unrepresented third parties, most conspicuously the
children. Using these three concepts-capacity, relative bargaining power, and externalities-I will provide a framework for understanding how one spouse can sometimes take advantage of
the other and why some divorce bargains are reached that may
not warrant enforcement. In short, I hope to provide a theory
that in essence justifies a presumption that favors private ordering, while also providing guidance about the reasons some safeguards are appropriate.
I.

THE ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE ORDERING

Let me begin with the arguments to support the presumption
in favor of private ordering. The core justification is rooted in
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notions of human liberty. The liberal ideal that individuals have
fundamental rights, and should freely choose to make of their
lives what they wish supports private ordering. In Charles
Fried's words, a regime of law that "respects the dispositions individuals make of their rights, carries to its logical conclusion
the liberal premise that individuals have rights." 2 Professor
Fried has eloquently defended on a nonutilitarian basis the principle that "persons may impose on themselves [through contracts] obligations where none existed before."3 He argues that
"the capacity to form true and rational judgments and act on
them is the heart of moral personality and the basis of a person's claim to respect as a moral being."" Thus, as a general
proposition, enforcement of agreements made at the time of divorce give expression to a "free man's rational decision about
how to dispose of what is his, how to bind himself."11
Private ordering is also justified on grounds of efficiency. 6 Ordinarily, the parties themselves are in the best position to evaluate the comparative advantages of alternative arrangements.
Each spouse, in the words of John Stuart Mill, "is the person
most interested· in his own well-being . . . with respect to his
own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those
that can be possessed by anyone else."7 Through negotiations,
opportunities exist for making both spouses better off than either would be if a court or some third party simply imposed a
result. 8 A consensual solution, by definition, more likely conforms with the preferences of each spouse than would a result
imposed by a court. Parental preferences often vary with regard
to money and child-rearing responsibilities. Through negotia2. C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 2 (1981). There are of course competing theories of
contract law not rooted in notions of liberty. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, (1979); Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563 (1982).
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 78.
5. Id.
6. I use efficiency here in the economic sense of Pareto efficiency. Such efficiency
requires an outcome where neither party can be made better off without making the
other contracting party worse off.
7. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY, in ON LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 68 (R.
McCallum ed. 1947) (1st ed. London 1859).
8. Note, however, that divorce itself no longer requires the consent of both spouses.
Situations arise, of course, where one spouse may not want a divorce, while the other
does. No-fault divorce laws now permit one spouse unilaterally to create a ground for
dissolution. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 954.
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tions, a greater likelihood exists that divorcing spouses can divide money and child-rearing responsibilities to reflect their own
individual preferences.
Finally, obvious and substantial savings occur when a couple
can resolve the distributional consequences of divorce without
resort to formal adjudication. The financial cost of litigation,
both private and public, lessens. A negotiated settlement allows
the parties to avoid the pain of the formal adversarial proceedings and the risks and uncertainties of litigation, which may involve all-or-nothing consequences. Given the substantial delays
that often characterize contested judicial proceedings, agreement
often saves time and allows each spouse to proceed with his or
her life. In short, against a backdrop of fair standards in the
shadow of which a couple bargains, divorcing couples should
have very broad powers to make their own arrangements. Additionally, significant limitations are inconsistent with the premises of no-fault divorce. The state should encourage parties to
settle the distributional consequences of divorce for themselves.
The state should also provide an efficient and fair mechanism
for enforcing such agreements and for settling disputes when the
parties are unable to agree.
IJ.

JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIMITATIONS ON PRIVATE ORDERING

A.

Capacity

On an abstract level, I find the general defense of private ordering both appealing and persuasive. But it is premised on the
notion that divorce bargaining involves rational, self-interested
individuals-that the average adult has the intelligence and experience to make a well-informed judgment concerning the desirability of entering into a particular divorce settlement. Given
the tasks facing an individual at the time of divorce, and the
characteristics of the relationship between divorcing spouses,
there are reasons to fear that this may not always be the case.
Informed bargaining requires a divorcing spouse to assess his
or her own preferences concerning alternative arrangements.
Radical changes in life circumstances complicate such assessments. Within a short period of time, separation and divorce
often subject spouses to the stresses of many changes.
"[S]pouses need to adjust to new living arrangements, new jobs,
new financial burdens, new patterns of parenting, and new con-
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ditions of social and sexual life."0 It may be particularly difficult
for a parent to assess custodial alternatives. The past will supply
a very incomplete guide to the future. Preferences may stem
from past experiences in which child-rearing tasks were performed in an ongoing two-parent family, and dissolution or divorce inevitably alters this division of responsibilities. Childrearing may now have new advantages or disadvantages for the
parents' own needs. A parent interested in dating may find the
child an intrusion in a way that the child never was during marriage. Because children and parents both change, and changes
occur unpredictably, projecting parental preferences for custody
into the future presents a formidable task. Nevertheless, most
parents have some self-awareness, however imperfect, and no
third party (such as a judge) is likely to have better information
about a parent's tastes, present or future.
Separation often brings in its wake psychological turmoil and
substantial emotional distress that can make deliberative and
well-informed judgments unlikely. It can arouse "feelings about
the (former) spouse, such as love, hate, bitterness, guilt, anger,
envy, concern, and attachment; feelings about the marriage, such
as regret, disappointment, bitterness, sadness, and failure; and
more general feelings such as failure, depression, euphoria, relief,
guilt, lowered self-esteem, and lowered self-confidence." 10 Isolini
Ricci has suggested that for many individuals "the emotions of
ending a marriage" characteristically go through five stages during a two or three year period. 11 She claims that during the first
three stages, an otherwise competent person may occasionally
have seriously impaired judgment. She suggests that the preseparation stage is often marked by "anxiety, depression, hostility, and recurring illness." The separation stage can bring with it
three dangerous side effects: "poor judgment; accident and illness-proneness, poor reflex action; and depression." The third
stage, which follows the separation, arouses strong emotions that
are "both natural and nasty." "Emotional roller-coasters are
9. Kresse!, Lopez-Morillas, Weinglass & Deutsch, Professional Intervention in Divorce: The Views of Lawyers, Psychotherapists, and Clergy, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION:
CONTEXT, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 256 (1979) [hereinafter cited as DIVORCE AND SEPA·
RATION] (article originally in 2 J. DIVORCE 119 (1978)).
10. Spanier & Casto, Adjustment to Separation and Divorce: A Qualitative Analysis, in DIVORCE AND SEPARATION, supra note 9, at 213.
11. I. RICCI, MoM's HousE/DAD's HousE 70 (1980). According to Ricci, these stages
are: (1) the period just before the actual separation-the beginning of a crisis period; (2)
the time of separation-a crisis period; (3) the eruption of strong emotions-a crisis period; (4) the adult adolescence of testing new roles and new identity; and (5) the more
mature identity and a new lifestyle.
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common at this stage, causing many people to feel permanent
emotional instability." According to Ricci, "this is the worst possible time to make any permanent decisions-especially legal
ones. Thinking and believing the worst about each other is one
of the chief hazards of this stage, and such thoughts, exaggerated and extended, can lead to serious complications. m 2
Such emotional turmoil may prevent for a time any negotiated
settlement. Or it may lead to a settlement that a party later
regrets.
Frequently, the partner who wishes to end the marriage
feels guilt at abandoning the spouse. Once the initiator·
finally broaches the topic of divorce, continued guilt,
combined with the equally strong desire to leave, may
produce a virulent form of the "settlement at any cost"
mentality. At the same time, the spouse who wishes to
keep the marriage may escalate demands, motivated by
feelings of humiliation and anger, combined with prospects of a bleak and unchosen future. Unreasonable demands may also be a means to prolong the marriage and
ultimately prevent the marital breakup.
An opposite pattern was also noted by several of our
respondents: guilt in the initiator may be expressed as
anger directed at the non-initiator, in whom feelings of
diminished self-worth may inhibit the ability to bargain
constructively, or produce an abject acceptance of almost
any terms. A settlement may thus be quickly arrived at
whose inequitable and unworkable nature may not be apparent until several years and several court fights later. 13
Some might think that the stresses and emotional turmoil of
separation and divorce undermine the essential premise of private ordering-individuals' capacity to make deliberate judgments. I disagree. For most persons the emotional upheaval is
transitory, and the stresses are an inevitable consequence of
having to make a new life. Temporary incapacity does not justify
state paternalism for an extended period of time. Nonetheless,
safeguards may be necessary, and the wooden application of the
traditional contract defense of "incompetence," which is ex12. The adversarial nature of our legal system can make matters worse by providing
an outlet for these feelings. "Even the most conciliatory and mediative attorneys find it
difficult to convince out-of-control clients that the legal process is not the appropriate
arena for their intense feelings of fear, spite, or anger." Id. at 75.
13. Kresse!, Lopez-Morillas, Weinglass & Deutsch, supra note 9, at 256.
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tremely limited, may provide insufficient protection. 14 More recent contract scholarship suggests a theory that respects the
ideal of individual autonomy and the efficiency of private ordering, and avoids the unfairness of bargains that exploit
incapacity.
Professor Eisenberg recently suggested a concept of "transactional incapacity" to capture the notion that "an individual may
be of average intelligence and yet may lack the aptitude, experience, or judgmental ability to make a deliberative and well-informed judgment concerning the desirability of entering into a
given complex transaction." 111 Eisenberg's concern was with situations where one party exploits the other party's incapacity to
deal with a complex transaction, "by inducing . . . a bargain
that a person who had capacity to deal with the transactions
probably would not make. " 18 In such circumstances, Eisenberg
suggests that neither fairness nor efficiency support application
of the principle that courts should support a private bargain to
its full extent. Unfairness arises because it violates conventional
moral standards "to make a bargain on unfair terms by exploiting ... incapacity." Moreover, "[t]he maxim that a promisor is
the best judge of his own utility can have little application: by
hypothesis, the promisor is not able to make a well-informed
judgment concerning the transaction." 17
Although Professor Eisenberg's concern was with the complexity of a particular transaction, and my concern is with a party's
temporarily diminished capacity because of his or her emotional
state, the concept of "transactional incapacity" can be applied
by way of analogy. When one spouse knows or has reason to
know of the diminished capacity of the other spouse, and exploits this incapability, a court should refuse to enforce the
agreement. Proof of exploitation, however, is essential. And a
critical question is how one tests for exploitation. I would require a showing that the terms of the agreement considered as a
whole fall outside the range of what would have been acceptable
to a competent person at the time of the settlement. 18 By pro14. Ordinary contract principles would require extreme impairment of cognitive capacity before allowing a defense of incompetence. Incompetence traditionally required a
showing that a party has childlike abilities, or is mentally disabled in a severe way. See 2
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 256 (1959).
15. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 763
(1982).
16. Id. at 764.
17. Id. at 765.
18. This test would permit the reviewing court to take into account the possible
transaction costs. A fully competent spouse might accept less than the expected value of
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viding a remedy only if a spouse exploited the other spouse's
incapacity by securing an unusually one-sided bargain, this test
will not create uncertainty in most cases. Many divorced spouses
may in retrospect think that they unwisely accepted some provision, and some might successfully show a lack of deliberative
judgment, but few will successfully show that the settlement as a
whole would have been unacceptable to a competent person.
Any additional uncertainty created for parties making "out of
the ordinary" deals may not constitute a bad thing. 19 Moreover,
I would create a presumption against the application of this diminished capacity doctrine in any cases where the party making
the claim was represented by counsel. Indeed, as Eisenberg suggests, "[i]f a party who has been urged, fairly and in good faith,
to seek advice, fails to do so, the doctrine of transactional incapacity would normally not apply, because the element of exploitation would be lacking" [at least where the party has sufficient capacity] "to understand the importance of getting
advice. " 20
A second prophylactic to guard against transitory diminished
capacity would involve a "cooling-off'' period, during which either party would be free to rescind a settlement agreement. In a
commercial context, this period is often very short-typically
three days. In the divorce context, I would make it considerably
longer-perhaps thirty to sixty days. Like any safeguard, a cooling-off period has costs. Some agreements may come apart even
though they involve no exploitation whatsoever, simply because
of ambivalence or a change of heart. Moreover, a party may strategically use the cooling-off period. A tentative agreement may
be reached, only to be later rescinded, in order to wear an opponent down. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to have a fixed,
reasonable "boundary line" as a rough estimate of the time
within which the "transitory state of acquiescence" induced by
guilt or anxiety might be expected to lapse. In cases where both
parties have assigned counsel, it might be possible to have a
shorter period. 21 In any event, a cooling-off period might well
an adjudicated judgment.
19. If independent counsel "signed off," a court should refrain from subsequent intervention to rescind. Perhaps the injured party should have a malpractice claim against
the lawyer in an extreme case.
20. Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 770 n.78.
21. Eisenberg discusses the case of "unfair persuasion" which he defines to mean
"the use of bargaining methods that seriously impair the free and competent exercise of
judgment and produce a state of acquiescence that the promisee knows or should know is
likely to be highly transitory." Id at 733-74. Under traditional contract rules, "undue
influence" was a ground of recision, but it required a pre-existing relationship between
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obviate the need for much substantive regulation by courts on
the ground of transactional incapacity.

B.

Unequal Bargaining Power

A second possible justification for imposing limits on private
ordering lies in a simple idea. In negotiations between two competent adults, if great disparity in bargaining power exists, some
bargains may arise that are unconscionably one-sided. 22 The notion of bargaining power has intuitive appeal, but defies easy
definition. Moreover, to speak of "unequal" bargaining power
implies that one can know when parties have "equal" bargaining
power. Without a complete theory of negotiations, it is hard to
give precise substantive content to the notion of bargaining
power, much less precisely define or measure "relative bargaining power." Nonetheless, by briefly analyzing the five elements
of the bargaining model I described in an earlier article, it is
possible to suggest why one divorcing spouse may be seen as
having greater ability to bring about an outcome favorable to
himself or herself.
First, bargaining is influenced by the partners' respective legal
endowments. The legal rules governing marital property, alimony, child support, and custody give each spouse certain
claims based on what each would get if the case goes to trial. In
other words, the outcome the law will impose if no agreement is
the parties where "one party is under the domination of another or by virtue of the
relationship between them is justified in assuming that the other party will not act in a
manner inconsistent with his welfare." See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 497
(1932). The commentary suggests that the relationship of husband and wife might ordi-narily fall within this rule, but that it would depend on a question of fact whether "the
relationship in a particular case is such as to give one party dominance over the other, or
put him in a position where words of persuasion have undue weight." Query whether the
relationship between a divorcing husband and wife would often justify a party's belief
that "the other party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare." See Auclair
v. Auclair, 72 Cal. App. 2d 791, 165 P.2d 527 (1946) (finding that husband and wife have
fiduciary obligations as a matter of law). In all events, Eisenberg suggests a doctrine of
"unfair persuasion" that should be applied irrespective of the prior relationship between
the parties, but "only where the promisee creates and exploits a state of acquiescence
that he knows or should know is only transitory." Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 777. He
supports a "cooling-off'' period within which the transitory state of acquiescence can
normally be expected to disappear. Id. at 776-77.
22. Temporary incapacity is arguably a special case of unequal bargaining power. If
one party is competent and the other is not, it would certainly seem that they have
unequal bargaining power. There are nonetheless distinct problems with this because it
is certainly possible that the two parties might each be entirely competent and capable
of exercising deliberative judgment, where one would nonetheless conclude that they had
very disproportionate bargaining power.
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reached gives each parent certain bargaining chips-an endowment of sorts. These endowments themselves can create unequal
bargaining power. For example, other things ·being equal, in a
state where a tender years presumption exists in favor of maternal custody, a mother who wants primary custody has considerably more bargaining power relative to the father than she would
in a state with a sex-neutral "best interest" standard. A new law
creating a presumption against spousal support, on the other
hand, would reduce the bargaining endowment of women as a
class. To the extent that negotiated settlements simply reflect
differences in bargaining power based on the legal rules themselves, no justification arises for a claim of unfairness in an individual case. Instead, the state should consider changing the legal
endowments.
Second, bargaining is very much influenced by each party's
preferences, i.e., how each party subjectively evaluates alternative outcomes. These preferences are not simply matters of
taste. A party's economic resources and life circumstances mold
them. The parties' relative bargaining power depends on how
each spouse subjectively evaluates the outcome a court would
impose. Consider, for example, the differences between the following two cases, each in a state where custody law provides for
joint custody. If both the mother and father are indifferent to
whether they have primary custody or joint custody, the perceived endowments of the two parties are comparable. Now, consider a case where the father likes joint custody better than his
having sole custody. The mother, on the other ,hand, has a
strong preference for her own sole custody over joint custody. In
such circumstances, if the father knows the mother's preferences, he might be seen as having greater bargaining power than
the mother because he could force on the mother his preferred
outcome (joint custody) and thus could require her to compensate him somehow if he is to accept some other arrangement.
The relationship of each party's preferences to outcome is explored further below.
A third element that affects bargaining concerns uncertainty,
and the parties' attitudes towards risk. Often the outcome in
court is far from certain, and the parties are negotiating against
a backdrop clouded by substantial uncertainty. Because the parties may have different risk preferences, this uncertainty can differentially affect the two spouses. If substantial variance exists
among the possible court-imposed outcomes, the relatively more
risk-averse party is comparatively disadvantaged.
A fourth element that affects bargaining relates to the differ-
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ential ability to withstand the transaction costs-both emotional
and economic-involved in negotiations. A party who has no immediate need for settlement, enjoys negotiations, and has plenty
of resources to pay a lawyer, has an obvious advantage over an
impatient opponent who hates negotiations, and cannot afford to
wait.
A fifth element concerns the bargaining process itself, and
strategic behavior. In divorce bargaining, the spouses may not
know each other's true preferences. Negotiations often involve
attempts by each side to discern the other side's true preferences, while making credible claims about their own preferences
and their intentions if a particular proposal is not accepted.
"Bargainers bluff, argue for their positions, attempt to deceive
or manipulate each other, and make power plays to gain advantage. " 23 Some people are more skilled negotiators than others.
They are better at manipulating information and managing impressions. They have a more refined sense of tactical action.
These differences can create inequalities in negotiations.
In short, negotiated outcomes depend in part on how each
spouse evaluates the consequences of what will happen absent
an agreement. Those evaluations are affected by both subjective
and objective elements. 24 This, in turn, depends not simply upon
the legal endowments, but on each party's subjective evaluation
of the outcome absent a negotiated agreement, and the probable
transaction costs of a court-imposed resolution. I am skeptical
about our ability to identify when parties have equal bargaining
23.

S.

BACHARACH

& E.

LAWLER, BARGAINING: POWER, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES

42

(1981). Bacharach and Lawler suggest that "[t]he task of a bargaining party is to con-

vince its opponent that it controls resources, that the opponent needs the resources, and
that it is willing to use power. These manipulative actions ultimately determine a party's
bargaining power." Id. at 51. They believe "punitive tactics are central to bargaining as
power itself . . . punitive tactics relate to the ability of one party to impose costs on the
other party." Id. Some commentators have suggested a distinction between bargaining to
give the other side as little as possible, and bargaining to get as much as possible for
oneself. A mediator, according to some commentators, can encourage people to avoid
spite and bargain for gains. The difficulty is that in the strategic game it is often possible
to get more for oneself by making a credible threat to harm the other side. One reason I
like mediation is because it tends to dampen strategic behavior.
24. Bacharach and Lawler suggest that
analysis of bargaining power ... requires a framework that (1) identifies the
multiple dimensions constituting each party's potential bargaining power, (2)
identifies the major types of bargaining tactics, (3) shows how the dimensions of
bargaining power affect tactical action, (4) shows how tactical action can alter
bargaining power, (5) examines the conditions under which given tactics affect
the bargaining outcomes, and (6) examines how outcomes at any given time affect potential power at later time.
Id. at 47.
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power. Nevertheless, to the extent that one spouse sees himself
as lacking alternatives and as being dependent upon resources
controlled by the other spouse, he might be said to be disadvantaged compared to his situation if he had better alternatives.
The following examples illustrate these notions, and suggest
why, even against a backdrop of "fair" legal endowments, some
negotiated outcomes will seem very one-sided.
Case 1 The Problem of Idiosyncratic Tastes- H and W,
who are divorcing, have as their only assets $30,000 cash and an
eighteenth-century French tapestry that cost $5,000 ten years
ago and today has a fair market value of $10,000. In states with
community property, a court must divide such property equally
according to its fair market value. With an indivisible tangible
asset such as a tapestry, the court has discretion to award it to
either party, compensating the other with other assets, or to order it sold and the proceeds divided.
Suppose this particular tapestry has great sentimental value
to H; he would, if necessary, pay $30,000 to keep it, even though
he knows it has a fair market value of $10,000. If W knew this,
then through hard bargaining she might end up with the $30,000
cash, while H received only the tapestry. In such circumstances,
H might resent that he had to "pay" $15,000 (his half of the
community's $30,000 cash) to buy W's half of the tapestry.
Nonetheless, he might prefer this negotiated outcome to the
risks of litigation if he thought substantial chance existed that
the court would award the tapestry to W and she would not resell it to him. This example demonstrates how private ordering
can lead to "one-sided" outcomes because the parties' preferences differ, even though the legal rule (here community property) treats the parties as equals. In essence, because the husband has idiosyncratic tastes, and attaches a higher-than-market
value to this particular tapestry, what the parties bargain over is
how to divide this surplus.
This example illustrates a more general characteristic of divorce bargaining. In many respects, it resembles a bilateral monopoly. In ordinary market transactions, one buyer does not
have to do business with any particular seller because there are
many others with whom to do business. In divorce, the spouses
must negotiate with one another, unless one or both simply accept the consequences-both legal and practical-of the non-cooperative solution where the court settles the dispute. Like a
monopolist selling to a monopsonist, the two spouses (or their
representatives) are locked in a dyadic relationship that they
cannot easily avoid. One way or another, the distributional ques-
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tions concerning marital property, spousal support, child support and custody must be resolved.
What consequences result from this bilateral monopoly? First,
opportunities often exist for both parties to gain through a negotiated resolution. Second, frequently one spouse may "take advantage" of the other spouse's preferences. Indeed, economic
theory suggests that while the range of possible efficient exchanges can be specified, the actual bargain struck within the
range eludes predetermination because of possible strategic interaction. In this example, an efficient outcome requires that H
get the tapestry, but the range of efficient outcomes might also
give him anywhere from $0 to $10,000 cash in addition. The outcome depends not only on the preferences of each party, but on
each party's knowledge of the other's preferences and how the
parties play the game.
This last point can be illustrated using the same tapestry example. Suppose a judge were to resolve the dispute by requiring
one spouse to cut the cake (i.e., divide the property into two
piles), and then having the other spouse choose the slice he or
she prefers (i.e., picking a preferred pile). 25 Assume H values the
tapestry at $30,000, and W values it at $10,000. If the parties
know each other's preferences, and no recontracting between the
spouses can occur after the division, then the amount H pays for
the tapestry will depend upon who gets to slice the cake. W
could presumably put the tapestry and $1 in one pile, and
$29,999 in the other pile. W would know that H would choose
the tapestry and $1, because H values that pile at $30,001 and
the other at $29,999. In essence, W could thus capture all the
surplus. If H were dividing, on the other hand, he could create
one pile with the tapestry and $9,999, and a second pile with
$20,001 cash. He would know that the wife would choose the second pile, and as a consequence he would have "bought" the
wife's half of the tapestry for only $1 more than its fair market
value .. Thus, he would have captured the surplus for himself.
Where each spouse is ignorant of the other's preference, the
25. There is interesting literature about the problem of dividing an object (such as a
cake) among a finite number of people so that each is satisfied that he has received a fair
share, although each may have a different opinion about which part of the cake is most
valuable. See Steinhaus, Sur la division pragmatique, 17 ECONOMETRICA (supplement)
315-19 (1949); Dubins & Spanier, How to Cut a Cake Fairly, 68 AM. MATHEMATICAL
(1961). For valuation disputes in divorce, one commentator has suggested a process in
which one party proposes a value, and then allows the court to award the object to either
party at the value placed on it. C. Markey, California Family Law, 24, 45; see also King,
Guidelines for Domestic Relations Cases 10 (San Francisco Super: Ct. 1977) (suggesting
a modified bidding arrangement where divorcing parties cannot agree on value).
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situation becomes more complicated. Under these circumstances, the one who cuts the cake suffers a disadvantage. For
example, if W is completely ignorant of H's preferences and assumes that his preferences resemble hers, then the only way she
can guarantee herself one-half the value of the property is by .
dividing the property into two parts that by her preferences are
of equal value. Presumably one pile would contain the tapestry
and $10,000 while the other pile would contain $20,000. In this
way, no matter which pile H chooses, she will guarantee herself
the equivalent of $20,000. With any other division, she risks
ending up with less than half the fair market value if H's preferences are the same as her own. For H, on the other hand, to
guarantee himself the value of the property (by his own preferences), he must place the tapestry in one pile, and $30,000 in the
other. Only with this division is he indifferent about which
choice W makes. With any less extreme split, he risks ending up
with less than half the value (by his preferences) if W's preferences are the same as his own.
Is it fair for W to be able to "exploit" H's idiosyncratic preferences by more than fair market value for her undivided interest
in the tapestry? This normative issue does not seem clear. H
might claim that ordinarily in a market economy a person enjoys
any surplus value over market value generated by his own preferences. Accordingly, H might claim that if W attaches no special value to the tapestry, H should receive the entire surplus.
W, on the other hand, might claim that she owns one-half the
tapestry, and as owner may sell it for whatever price she can get.
Surely, if H and W were strangers, W would have the right to
refuse to sell the tapestry unless H paid $30,000 for it.
Case 2 Economic Inequalities and Urgent Need- Consider
now a second example, which I find more troubling, of one-sided
agreements with "fair" legal endowments. H has substantial separate property and a high income. W has neither. Their only
community asset consists of a house that H and W own outright.
The housing market is currently depressed, and very few houses
are selling. Realtors believe that they can sell the house within
six months for between $150,000 and $180,000, provided the sellers would accept a $100,000 ten-year mortgage at 12 percent interest, which falls below the present market rate of 14 percent.
H and W could sell this mortgage for $65,000, making the net
present value of the house between $115,000 and $145,000.
H knows that W is very short of funds and eager to move to a
new city where she wishes to buy a condominium and start
anew. Both Hand W recognize that without a negotiated settle-
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ment a year would pass before a court would require the home
to be put on the market. When W asks H to buy out her interest
in the home, H offers W $40,000 on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
saying that he would just as soon continue to own the house
with W. W reluctantly accepts, because she believes that if she
does not sell to H now, two years may pass before she can force
the sale of the house, and get her equity out by reselling her
share of the mortgage that is taken back. H and W both know
that one-half of the present value of the expected sale price
(taking account of the mortgage) exceeds $40,000, but no market
exists for undivided one-half interests in residential real estate.
If H doesn't buy her one-half interest, W must wait until a judge
forces a sale of the house. Unlike the first case, where H decided
to buy his wife's share of the tapestry at a price above the fair
market value, in this case W has decided to sell for less than the
fair market value in order to avoid the delays and inconvenience
of an adjudicated result.
Does this case represent one in which W accepted an "unfair
price" because H exploited W's distress? Professor Eisenberg
has suggested that in circumstances where one party "is in a
state of necessity that effectively compels [her] to enter into a
bargain with any terms [she] can get ... [n]either fairness nor
efficiency, the two major props of the bargain principle," support
enforcement of the deal.2 6 Eisenberg gives as an example an injured traveler stranded in the desert who must bargain with a
geologist to save his life. In Eisenberg's example, the traveler
bargains for his life; here W bargains for the opportunity to start .
a new life sooner.
What is the appropriate remedy in such a case? If there is a
preliminary review of this agreement by a court, should it be
rejected by the court? Even if the wife is not objecting? After H
has paid W, should she later be able to rescind the agreement?
Should W be able to argue that H received unjust enrichment,
and that she was entitled to the difference between what she
actually received, and what was reasonably and justly due?
In cases like this, the problem of exploitation arises not because of W's ignorance. To the contrary, her consent to this
agreement is real. As Professor Dawson pointed out in his seminal article many years ago, "the more unpleasant the alternative,
the more real the consent to a course which would avoid
it." 27 The underlying issue concerns in part the question of what
26.
27.

Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 754-55.
Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45

MICH.

L.

REV.

253, 267
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pressures a party can legitimately apply in bargaining, and how
and whether the state should regulate the manner in which such
pressures are exercised. No controversy would exist if W had
shown that she accepted $40,000 because of physical threats by
H. The doctrine of "duress" has traditionally permitted a defense to the enforcement of a contract through threats of illegal
conduct. In this case, however, H's conduct was not illegal.
Nonetheless, H plainly took advantage of W's desire to sell
quickly. One's appraisal of the morality of H's conduct might
depend on an evaluation of whether he was somehow responsible
for W's urgent need. In the first case, W was not in any sense
responsible for H's preference for French tapestry. In this case,
however, we may wish to treat Has responsible for W's distress.
While I am reluctant to allow a court to evaluate the fairness
of financial settlements in divorce bargains, the second case
deeply troubles me. The various doctrines of contract law clearly
permit intervention in egregious cases where inequality in bargaining power has unjustly enriched one spouse. The underlying
philosophical and jurisprudential issues remain difficult, but
they do not, in my view, undermine the general reasons to favor
private ordering, any more than the doctrines of duress or unconscionability undermine all of contract law. A variety of legal
mechanisms exist to change the results of unfair divorce bargains. For example, the alteration of bargaining endowments
and the use of ex post review can serve to prevent unjust enrichment brought about by morally unacceptable conduct.

C.

Externalities-Third Party Effects

Third party effects provide the last set of reasons that justify
limiting private ordering. A legal system that gives divorcing
couples freedom to determine for themselves their postdissolution rights and responsibilities may lead to settlements that reflect the spouses' interests. But negotiated agreements can also
have important consequences for third parties, and affect social
interests that private negotiations fail to consider adequately.
The economists' idea of "externalities"-the notion that in some
circumstances market prices that affect the behavior of buyers
and sellers will not adequately reflect the full range of social
costs-has application here. In negotiating divorce settlements,
the spouses may make decisions that have consequences for
(1947).

1032

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 18:4

third. parties which, if taken into account, would suggest some
more: socially desirable settlement.
A divorce settlement may affect any number of interests not
taken into account in the spouses' negotiations. The state's fiscal
interests can be affected, for example. The economic terms of
the bargain between the two spouses may substantially affect
the odds that a custodial parent will later require public transfer
payments. 28 The most important third party effects concern the
children, although externalities can exist with respect to other
family members as well. 29 At a conceptual level, one can easily
see how a negotiated settlement may reflect parental preferences
but not the child's desires or needs. From the perspective of
spouses who negotiate their own settlements, marital property,
alimony, and child support issues all basically present problems
of money, and distinctions among them become very blurred.
Each translates into present dollar values. 30 Moreover, custodial
arrangements can often be divided in a wide variety of ways.
From a bargaining perspective, the money and custody issues inextricably link together. 31 Negotiated settlements will certainly
reflect parental preferences with regard to these money and custody issues. Generally, self-interested judgments will not solely
determine these preferences. One hopes that parental prefe1·ences reflect a desire for their children's happiness and well-being, quite apart from any parental advantage. Nevertheless,
some parents may engage in divorce bargaining on the basis of
preferences that narrowly reflect their selfish interests, and ignore their children's needs. For example, a father may threaten
a custody fight over the child, not because he wants custody, but
28. For example, ·a mother might decide to forego all alimony and child support pay•
ments from the child's father in order to avoid any future relationship with him. If the
father's resources were small, this decision might "cost" the mother and child very little
or nothing, if public assistance payments make up the difference. Nonetheless, if the
welfare system is premised on the private support obligation, the mother's decision (if it
were binding on the state's power to claim reimbursement from the father) would have
obvious effects on the public fisc. Indeed in this example, a solution that largely respects
the private agreement is possible. The economic agreement made by the spouses can be
effective inter se but can be treated as having no effect on the state's right to collect
child support from the father.
29. For example, visitation and custody agreements may reflect the parents' interests,
but not those of grandparents and other family members.
30. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 959-63. Although there are differences among the three elements with respect to termination and enforcement risks, the
value of different bundles of the three elements can be compared. See id.
31. Two reasons exist. First, over some range of alternatives, each parent may be
willing to exchange custodial rights and obligations for income or wealth. Second, parents may tie support duties to custodial prerogatives as a means of enforcing their rights
without resort to court. See id. at 963-66.
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because he wants to push his wife into accepting less support,
even though this will have a detrimental effect on the child. A
custodial parent, eager to escape an unhappy marriage, may offer to settle for a small amount in order to sever relations soon.
A custodial parent may negotiate to eliminate largely the child's
contact with the other parent, not because of the child's wants
or needs, but because the custodial parent despises his ex-spouse
and wants nothing more to do with her.
Concerns about the effects of divorce on children underlie
many of the formal limitations on private ordering, e.g., the requirement of court review of private agreements relating to custody and child support; the legal rules prohibiting parents from
making nonmodifiable and binding agreements concerning these
elements. In addition, the potential conflict of interest between
divorcing parents and their children has led many to advocate
the appointment of counsel for children, so that the children's
interests can be directly represented in divorce proceedings.
Over the years, numerous commentators have expressed the
fear that courts rubber-stamp custodial arrangements in uncontested divorces, and that this proves harmful for children. 32 In
1968, for example, Judge Justine Polier complained:
In the vast proportion of cases where divorce is not contested, the question of the welfare of children, in terms of
which parent has more to offer to their healthy development, is not considered by the court . . . . Divorce is
granted, and the children automatically go to the plaintiff, as benefits and burdens go with the land that is sold.
The pre-divorce agreement between the parties may or
may not reflect concern for the welfare of the children.
The primary interest of one party in escaping the marriage, or financial considerations unrelated to the soundness of the custody or visitation agreements, control the
disposition of the children. The mental health of the respective parents, past anti-social behavior, and their ability to be parents are not subjected to scrutiny. 33
I have written elsewhere on these issues,3' and I remain very
32. See L. HALEM, D1voRCE REFORM: CHANGING LEGAL AND Soc1AL PERSPECTIVES 227
(1980).
33. J. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 113 (1968).
34. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 950.
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skeptical about the wisdom of assigning counsel for children in
uncontested divorces, 35 and the requirement of judicial review of
negotiated settlements in all divorce cases involving children. 36
These issues involve more than an assessment of the practical
usefulness of various safeguards. They also relate to the fundamental issue of free choice: how should the power and responsibility to define what is in the interests of children be allocated at
the time of divorce? Who decides on behalf of the child? To
what extent should the child's parents possess the freedom to
decide how to allocate the responsibility for their children following divorce?
When a divorce affects minor children, the state obviously has
interests broader than simply dispute settlement. The state also
has responsibility for child protection. 37 To acknowledge this responsibility, however, is not to define its limits. Indeed, the critical' questions concern the proper scope of the child-protection
function at the time of divorce and the mechanisms that best
perform this function.
I believe divorcing parents should maintain considerable freedom to decide custody matters-subject only to the same minimum standards for protecting the child from neglect and abuse.
that the state imposes on all families. The actual determination
of what is in fact in a child's best interests is ordinarily quite
indeterminate. 38 Such a determination requires predictions beyond the capacity of the behavioral sciences and involves imposition of values about which little consensus exists in our society. 39 It is for this reason that I conclude that the basic question
is who gets to decide on behalf of the child.
A negotiated resolution is desirable from the child's perspective for several reasons. First, a child's social and psychological
relationships with both parents ordinarily continue after the divorce. A process that leads to agreement between the parents
rather than one that necessarily has a winner and a loser better
ensures a child's future relationship with each of his parents.
Notions of child protection hardly justify general judicial suspicion of parental agreements; the state's interest in the child's
well-being in fact implies a concomitant interest in facilitating
parental agreement.
35. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 1, at 988-90.
36. Id. at 994-96.
37. See Mnookin, supra note 34, at 229, 232.
38. Id. at 255-62.
39. Id. at 258-61.
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Second, the parents know more about their child than will the
judge, because they have better access to information about the
child's circumstances and desires. Indeed, a custody decision privately negotiated by those responsible for the child's care after
the divorce seems much more likely than a judicial decision to
match the parents' capacities and desires with the child's needs.
Parents, undoubtedly, occasionally make mistakes concerning
custodial arrangements, but so do judges. More fundamentally
(given the epistemological problems inherent in knowing what is
best for a child), reason exists to doubt our capacity to know
whether any given decision is a mistake. Therefore, the possibility that negotiated agreements fail to maximize the child's welfare hardly serves as sufficient argument against a preference for
private ordering. Moreover, because parents, not state officials,
are primarily responsible for the day-to-day child-rearing decisions before and after divorce, parents, not judges, should have
primary authority to agree on custodial arrangements. This
means that courts should not second-guess parental agreements
unless the narrow child-protection standard implicit in neglect
laws demands judicial intervention. Nonetheless, the state has
an important responsibility to inform parents concerning the
child's needs during and after divorce and an important interest
in facilitating parental agreement. The law in action, which acknowledges substantial parental power, seems preferable to existing doctrine, which imposes substantial restrictions on the
parents' power to decide for themselves.
Because primary responsibility for child-rearing after divorce
does and should remain with parents, a strong presumption
should favor the parental agreement and limits ori the use of
coercive state power by judges or other professionals to force
parents to act as the professional thinks best. On the other
hand, I think the state has an important interest in encouraging
parents to understand that the responsibility for their children
extends beyond the divorce, that children are in many ways at
risk during the divorcing process, and that in deciding about the
child-rearing arrangements the parents have an important obligation to meet their children's needs. Moreover, there is reason
to think that by facilitating parental agreement, and helping the
parents transform their old relationship into one in which they
can now do business together with respect to the children's future needs, the interests of the children are being served.
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CONCLUSION

From a legal perspective, separation and divorce pose four distributional issues, any of which may lead to a dispute between
the spouses. These issues are: (a) How should the couple's property-the stock of existing wealth, separately or together-be divided? (b) What ongoing claim should each spouse have on the
future earnings of the other? (c) What ongoing claims should a
child have for his share of the earnings or wealth of each of his
parents? (d) How should the responsibilities and opportunities
of child-rearing be divided in the future? The legal system specifies both substantive rules (i.e., marital property law, alimony
law, child support law, and custody and visitation law) and a set
of procedures that seek to resolve these disputes.
I believe that the primary function of the legal system at the
time of divorce is to facilitate private ordering-in other words,
to provide a framework within which divorcing couples can
themselves determine their postdissolution rights and responsibilities against a backdrop of fair rules and procedures. My general defense of private ordering depends on the ideal of individual autonomy and liberty and arguments based on efficiency and
cost. At the beginning of this article, I emphasized that my defense of private ordering was not premised on an absence of important social interests in how the process works or in the fairness of the outcomes. The critical issues are ones of emphasis
and degree: to what extent should the law permit and encourage
divorcing couples to work out their own arrangements? Within
what limits should parties make their own law by private
agreement?
While I have not attempted to answer these questions with
any precision, or to define with exactitude the precise limits of
private ordering, I have suggested three justifications for limitations upon divorce settlements: (1) problems of capacity, which
go to the issue of whether in a particular case one party has exploited the other party's inability to make a deliberative judgment; (2) proplems in bargaining that may lead to unconscionable results, even if both parties are competent, and the legal
endowments are generally considered fair; and (3) problems of
externalities, where the concern lies with the impact of the negotiated agreement on persons not represented in the divorce bargaining process.
My framework certainly does not make previously intractable
family law problems disappear. But it does suggest an important
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intellectual agenda for those concerned with dispute settlement
and divorce. How do the rules and procedures used in court for
adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs
between divorcing couples outside the courtroom? How do various procedural requirements affect the parties' behavior during
the time they are resolving various distributional issues, and
thereafter? What rules and procedures facilitate dispute settlement, and how do alternatives affect the future relationship of
the former spouses to each other and to their children in subsequent years? In short, how do we best design rules and procedures that respect personal autonomy by facilitating private ordering, and ensure fairness by establishing appropriate
safeguards against the risks that incapacity or third party effects
may lead to unjust results?

